

R&R Syria AISBL

Peacebuilding Programme Line

Lebanon 2013-2015

Decision	Budget	Duration
Motion of JIC: 11/06/2013	Target: €241,600/year	15/06/2013 - 31/12/2015
Board R&R Syria: 11/06/2013	Minimum: €4,700/month	Priority AA

I. Scope

The Peacebuilding Programme Line Lebanon 2013-2015 is the overarching programme for all activities of R&R Syria AISBL in Lebanon. All other Programme Lines shall relate to its basic provisions and to the basic infrastructure established through this Programme Line.

Based on a thorough conflict and needs assessment, R&R Syria decided to start operations in Lebanon as long as open hostilities are still continuing within Syria. Even though this overarching Programme Line for Lebanon has to be renewed after the end of 2015, the work in Lebanon is not supposed to be limited in time. Our main partner organisation is R&R Lebanon, which is an independent national branch of our international organisation R&R Syria AISBL.

The main objective of R&R Syria is to combine peacebuilding and reconciliation work with practical help for those in need who are affected by the Syrian crisis. This applies also to Lebanon, which has seen an unprecedented influx of Syrian refugees and which is still a divided country itself. Three principles are governing this approach. a) We are working at local and regional level in places with mixed communities that have seen an increase in tensions and in some cases open violence. b) We are inviting moral authorities of all communities in the areas of operation to form a local Steering Committee that is co-deciding with us on the implementation of our work. Moral authorities entail religious leaders of different communities and other representatives of civil society. c) We will unite these moral authorities around a concrete common cause: the future of the youth in need, to help children and adolescents traumatised by the war to exit the cycle of violence.

This approach will materialise in the establishment of Peace Centres in targeted areas under the co-deciding supervision of local Steering Committees. Peace Centres are houses that serve as an open space to the youth in need, both from refugee and host populations, and as central hub for all other activities of R&R Syria. Peacebuilding is taking place on three levels: a) moral authorities of different communities will work together in the Steering Committee; b) youth of different communities will learn and work together in the Peace Centre; c) beneficiaries and their communities will be invited to attend activities related to dialogue and reconciliation. This Programme Line specifies the modalities of these activities and also serves as an umbrella for other programme lines that will specify the more practical activities in helping the youth in need, such as psychosocial support, educational work or humanitarian aid. Peacebuilding and reconciliation are the overarching objectives governing all of them; they shall be achieved through a form of mainstreaming in all activities.

This Programme Line shall cover every R&R Peace Centre established in Lebanon, including outreach activities in their surroundings. It was endorsed by the Joint Implementation Committee of R&R Syria and R&R Lebanon and adopted by the Board of Directors of R&R Syria on the aforementioned dates for the aforementioned duration. This Programme Line is labelled as Priority AA with regard to available funding; following a decision of the Board, it might be frozen if no funding is available for covering at least the specified minimum operational costs for three following months, after deduction of minimum operational costs for Programme Lines with higher priority.

II. Conflict Assessment

The team of R&R Syria has carried out a thorough conflict assessment with regard to the impact of the Syrian crisis refugees in Lebanon, having consulted international and national organisations operating in this field as well as Lebanese experts and refugee families. Here some observations on the situation and on the state of play of the crisis response:

(a) The Syrian crisis and its spill-over to Lebanon

Our concern is to see a peaceful movement for human dignity and change being pushed into sectarian war. In Syria, massive crimes against humanity are committed every day. Civilians are the target of indiscriminate bombing, shelling and even of massacres through militias that show the patterns of ethnic cleansing. As of May 2013, more than 80,000 have been killed; more than 5 million are displaced (a third of the entire population); more than 2 million have fled into neighbouring countries. The Assad regime has followed an escalation strategy in order to defend its power, from arbitrary detention and torture over the deployment of the army and sectarian militias, to the large-scale use of heavy weaponry, air strikes and missile attacks. The vicious cycle of violence and revenge has led to a radicalisation of parts of the opposition. Brutality and sectarian hatred are rising.

With an estimated amount of more than 1 million Syrian refugees stranded in Lebanon (a country of merely 4 to 5 million inhabitants), the spill-over of the crisis is quite obvious. The politics of both countries have always been closely related, not only since the Lebanese Civil War. Confessional tensions are rising in Lebanon along the lines of political alliances with or against the Assad regime. Since the beginning of the Syrian revolution, this can be observed in the coastal town of Tripoli where the minority Alawi population support the regime and majority of the Sunni population strongly sympathise with the opposition. Militants in the rival quarters of Jabel Mohsen and Bab el-Tabeneh have repeatedly engaged in day-long fighting. These clashes are not a new phenomenon, but the death toll has recently risen significantly. But Tripoli is not the only Lebanese city affected by the Syrian crisis. Deadly clashes in the Bekaa, most notably in the border city of Aarsal, and in Saida have been seen as direct impact of what is happening across the border.

(b) Lines of conflict between different confessions and groups

It would be wrong to reduce the Syrian conflict to a confessional war. The peaceful movement for human dignity and change that started the revolution is transcending sectarian lines. On the other hand, the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which is indeed relying to a certain extent on his own Alawi sect, also counts many Sunnis amongst its supporters. Syria has known a long story of peaceful coexistence between different sects. Amongst ordinary Syrians, there are very few who ask for revenge and the extermination of the other. We have heard strong stories from families who have lost fa-

thers, sons and daughters and who are still advocating peace and forgiveness. However, the deployment of sectarian militia by the regime, the growing military strength of radical Sunni groups and the ever rising number of atrocities have pushed the conflict into a more and more religious dimension, mainly along the geostrategic divide between Sunnis and Shiites that is affecting the entire Middle East. Foreign powers are further fuelling this divide.

Lebanon is an essential piece in this geostrategic puzzle, mainly due to the fact that Hezbollah is one of the strongest and most powerful Iranian allies in the region. On the political level, the Syrian crisis is perceived as a decisive conflict for Lebanon. Political actors in Lebanon expect it to bring “the solution” to the long lasting political rivalry, in one way or the other. The Lebanese power struggle between the pro-Assad March 8 coalition and the anti-Assad March 14 alliance, which has dominated Lebanese politics since 2005, will be somehow decided through the outcome of the Syrian civil war. The Sunni-led coalition of March 14 aspires to change the dynamics in Lebanon and gather momentum against the power grasp of the Hezbollah-led coalition of the March 8 camp. Until the war is over, the Syrian crisis has therefore led to another deadlock of the Lebanese political system, most tangible in the endless discussion about the shape of a new electoral law.

The neutral stance Lebanon officially took towards the Syrian crisis will be altered by the nowadays open and large-scale intervention by Hezbollah in Syria, with several thousand fighters on the ground. This intervention is far stronger than the few combatants that had joined the Syrian opposition before. It is also a trigger for igniting the Sunni-Shiite conflict in Lebanon, possibly leading to a large-scale armed confrontation within the Cedar State. Salafi groups and clerics, most notably the Saida-based Sheikh Assir, are inciting more and more aggressively against Hezbollah and are calling for a “jihad” to support the uprising in Syria. Also the Free Syrian Army and the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat el Nusra are threatening to attack Hezbollah inside Lebanon. Open violence is most likely to increase in the surroundings of Tripoli, Saida and in the Bekaa Valley.

The Christians and Druze are somehow caught in the middle of this unfolding Sunni-Shiite conflict. In Syria, many of them (though by far not all) hold to the regime out of fear of what might come next. In Lebanon, a bigger proportion is supporting the Syrian revolution out of bad memories of the Assad regime from the time of the Civil War and in loyalty to the Sunni-led March 14 alliance. Druze are divided between both camps, with the majority faction under leadership of Walid Jumblatt recently shifting more towards the Syrian revolution.

(c) Tensions between Syrian refugee and Lebanese host population

The presence of a million refugees who are mainly Sunnis creates a growing fear on the side of many Christians as well as Shiites in the country. Whereas Christians feel reminded of the decades-long presence of Palestinians, the Shiite party Hezbollah is concerned that Sunni refugees in its strongholds might turn against them. Besides the sectarian conflict lines, already well-established in the past, tensions are also rising due to the sheer number of refugees that have arrived in the Cedar State. About 420,000 of them have been officially registered with the UNHCR. However, the real number is said to be more than twice that amount. R&R Syria itself has met many refugees who do not register for the fear that their data might fall into the hands of the Assad regime that has announced to treat every refugee as traitor. Even though the Lebanese have shown an unprecedented degree of hospitality, welcoming refugees who represent more than 25% of the Lebanese population, tensions are now rising, for political but also for purely economic reasons.

Due to the proximity with Syria as well as to family and kinship, the northern border region of Akkar and the western Bekaa region host the biggest amount of refugees. Both of these have been the poorest regions of Lebanon for many years. As the Lebanese government has decided not to open formal refugee camps, most of them are renting private space where possible or are camping in unofficial settlements with very poor infrastructure. Prices are rising considerably and the local population can often not afford the most basic services. Furthermore, in border areas like Akroum or Wadi Khaled, the Lebanese state has never been present on the ground as main service deliverer for the local population. For years, these regions have been ignored and left behind by both the government and international organisations. The massive arrival of the latter in response to the Syrian crisis is hence seen by many as a bitter irony, especially when they decide to restrict assistance to refugees alone without addressing the most urgent needs of the Lebanese host population.

(d) State of play of the national and international crisis response in Lebanon

Since the beginning of the refugee crisis in Lebanon, local communities, charity organisations, churches and mosques have made an incredible effort to meet the needs of the new arrivals. Solidarity prevails, but tensions between local residents and refugees are on the rise and have to be observed carefully. One particular problem in the crisis response is the fact that humanitarian aid is usually not perceived as neutral in Lebanon. The distribution of resources of any kind is instead much more associated with political affiliation and nepotism.

The Lebanese government delegated an important part of the crisis management to international organisations like the UNHCR and big international NGOs. But even these are often confronted with the partisan distribution of aid. Inside Syria, the Assad regime has made impartial distribution almost impossible, by targeting emergency aid in rebel-held areas and by insisting on restricting the delivery of aid items to loyal forces. This partisan approach is also marking crisis response in Lebanon. Even though international organisations have made great efforts, the fact that more than half of the estimated refugees have not registered with the UNHCR, more than 2 years after the outbreak of the crisis, can be seen as an utter failure, mainly due to the political situation in Lebanon.

Today a mass of different local, national and international actors are responding to the most urgent needs of refugees. Due to the informal and asymmetric distribution of refugees throughout the country, the coordination of aid efforts is extremely difficult. As mentioned before, tensions are also rising due to the fact that the Lebanese host population is receiving almost no assistance despite inflation in prices resulting from the crisis .

More and more actors agree that peacebuilding and reconciliation is much needed not only in terms of regional stability but also to assure a sustainable distribution of humanitarian aid. Until now, only few organisations have addressed this issue. Peacebuilding initiatives existing in Lebanon before the start of the Syrian crisis do not have experience in dealing with refugee issues.

III. Objectives

This Programme Line is the overarching programme for all activities of R&R Syria AISBL in Lebanon. Its objectives shall also serve as overall objectives for each other Programme Line to be implemented in this country. The following objectives shall hence serve as overall objectives and as specific objectives for the implementation of the Peacebuilding Programme Line:

- a) To build reconciliation, justice and peace amongst different confessions and groups who are pushed into the rationale of a sectarian war in the context of the Syrian conflict.
- b) To mitigate tension among different sectarian groups within and between both refugees from Syria and host communities in Lebanon in areas with high refugees concentration.
- c) To unite moral authorities of different confessions and communities around a common cause: the future of the youth affected by the Syrian conflict.
- d) To appease sectarian hatred and violence in the hearts of the youth of different confessions and groups by opening perspectives for the future.

IV. Target Population

The main target population are Syrian refugees in the surroundings of each R&R Peace Centre in the North and in the Bekaa regions of Lebanon. However, Lebanese host communities shall be actively integrated into the work of each Peace Centre, avoiding hence tensions between refugee and host population. The following groups are particularly targeted by this Programme Line:

- a) Moral authorities from different confessions and groups, both Syrian and Lebanese, including religious leaders and representatives of local civil society organisations
- b) Adolescents from different confessions of both refugee and host communities from the age of 13 to 19, especially those who are prone to radicalisation or violent behaviour
- c) The families of the aforementioned target groups, including children from the age of 6 to 12 who are enrolled in one of the other Programme Lines associated to the Peace Centres

R&R will start its operations with the establishment of a first Peace Centre in the surroundings of Halba (Akkar), as specified in the description of activities below. This first Peace Centre is supposed to cover the entire band of the Akkar caza. However, the following sub-areas of the Akkar shall be particularly targeted by outreach activities:

- Between Halba, El Aabde and Berqayel (Area AA): outreach starting in 06/13
- Between Halba, Aakar el Aatiqa and Meshmesh (Area AB): outreach starting in 06/13
- Between Halba, El Bire and Mashba (Area AC): outreach starting in 07/13
- Sahl area, between Halba and El Aarida (Area AD): outreach starting in 07/13
- Wadi Khaled and Akroum (Area AE): outreach operations foreseen in future
- Qbayyat area (Area AF): no operations foreseen in the near future

A second Peace Centre is scheduled to be established in the Western Bekaa in the following months, most probably in the surroundings of Jobb Jennine. The exact operational areas have yet to be determined, but the aforementioned target groups shall equally apply.

V. Expected Results

The following measurable results are expected as output of this Programme Line. They have to be seen in close association with the results of the other Programme Lines currently foreseen, which are supposed to serve as pillars supporting these overarching peacebuilding activities:

- a) At least two Peace Centres have been established in mixed confessional areas with a significant influx of Syrian refugees, dedicated to serve as rallying point for moral authorities of different communities and as hub for mainly youth-related activities.
- b) At least two regional Steering Committees have been established, each as co-deciding body for the management of every Peace Centre, composed by moral authorities of all religious communities in the region and of local civil society organisations.
- c) Each Steering Committee has met at least once a year at highest regional authority level and at least quarterly at executive level; it has adopted and signed a Peace Charter as basic understanding, including the provision of organising joint visits to places of sectarian tension.
- d) Amongst the direct beneficiaries of the Peace Centre, children and adolescents of all major confessions in the respective target region were present; at least 30% of participants in all common youth-related activities have been Syrians and at least 30% Lebanese.
- e) At least 50% of all direct beneficiaries have participated in dialogue and conflict transformation modules, proposed in the premises of the Peace Centres.

VI. Activities

The central output of this Programme Line is to establish regional Steering Committees, composed by moral authorities and representatives of civil society from different confessions and communities that will serve as co-deciding bodies for the establishment of Peace Centres. The particular approach of this Programme Line relies on the establishment of a factual cooperation between different communities around a common cause: the future of the youth. This goal represents the overarching roof of this Programme Line, which shall be supported by at least three pillars outlined in separate but complementary Programme Lines: two pillars that are targeting children and adolescents through psychosocial and educational support; a third pillar addressing material humanitarian emergencies shall also involve regional partner organisations and municipalities. All pillars combine to serve the overall peacebuilding objectives.

(a) Establishing Steering Committees of local moral authorities for the establishment and maintenance of Peace Centres

In each of the locations where Peace Centres shall be opened, one regional Steering Committee of moral community leaders and representatives of civil society will be established. Each Steering Committee will play a direct role in all peacebuilding activities and will serve as a co-deciding authority supervising the implementation of all other activities in the Peace Centres. Its recommendations will be respected by the R&R management as far as they do not contradict the scope and the objectives of the activities, as outlined in this description, or the spirit and values of R&R Syria AISBL re-

garding the respect of fundamental human rights and best practices, particularly with regard to minorities and the protection of minors.

During the assessment phase, an extended group of esteemed moral personalities has been involved in the preparation of the work of R&R Syria AISBL in Lebanon. They include religious representatives of all groups present in the target areas, representatives of local non-partisan NGOs, and personalities who are highly valued for their contribution to peaceful dialogue and non-partisanship amongst and between communities. At least one representative of the Syrian refugee population will be invited to participate in each Committee. The so-formed Steering Committees will be responsible for supervising and monitoring the activities of the Peace Centres, with particular regards to their adequacy in view to their main aim of peacebuilding. The Steering Committees will meet at least once a year at leadership level (highest dignitaries present in the region) and at least quarterly at executive level (representatives nominated by the high dignitaries). At the act of establishment of the Steering Committees, a Memorandum of Understanding and an Operative Protocol will be co-signed by the Committee members and by R&R Syria under the title "Peace Charter". The Protocol will include the commitment of signatories to intervene and react with mutual public statements and physical common presence in case of local crises or acts of sectarian violence, and this with the aim of supporting dialogue and condemning violence.

This activity relies on the resources of local communities to manage conflicts and mitigate tensions, empowering widely respected persons from the target areas to be actively and mutually involved. It is a community-based approach to peacebuilding, based on already existing traditional structures and local leaders for conflict transformation, with the contingent aim of mitigating tensions between and among refugee and host populations. The activity has the long-term aim of building the local capacity to support peace and conflict resolution in host communities, and to effectively be capable to react to any future crisis. It shall also serve as a model for similar operations to be implemented within Syria as soon as safe access becomes possible.

(b) Establishing Peace Centres and Outreach Centres as activity hubs for children and youth of different confessions, both from refugee and host communities

At least two main Peace Centres shall be established, one in the surroundings of Halba (Akkar) and one in the surroundings of Jobb Jennine (Western Bekaa). The two centres shall serve as main regional hubs to conduct integration and peacebuilding activities with children and youth of different communities and confessions, including both refugee and host communities. Each main Peace Centre shall be managed by a Lebanese regional Field Manager, and shall be staffed with several operators under the provisions of the supplementary Programme Lines.

The two main Peace Centres shall establish at least five smaller Outreach Centres in the following locations: Wadi Khaled and the Sahl area in the Akkar, Rashaya, Ghazze, and Taanayel in the Bekaa. The Outreach Centres shall depend methodologically and operatively on the two main Peace Centres. The staff of the main Peace Centres shall supervise and monitor the activities run within outreach centres. Some of the activities shall be directly implemented by the staff of the two main Peace Centres, which shall operate as "mobile units". Nonetheless, the outreach centres shall also rely on their own staff, selected within the network of local NGOs.

Local staff of all Centres shall be trained on issues relating to peacebuilding and interreligious dialogue, personal security and safety, advocacy and minority protection issues, child and youth safety,

inclusive educational approaches, and in recognising post-traumatic symptoms among the beneficiaries. A house psychologist in each main Peace Centres will be responsible to coordinate psychosocial activities in each target region and to monitor the approach towards beneficiaries.

The Centres shall particularly target children and adolescents, as they are the most sensitive and exposed components of both host and refugee populations in target areas. Furthermore, the complementary Programme Lines may possibly include adult family members of direct beneficiaries through day-by-day work with youngsters. The Centres will promote values of solidarity, peace, tolerance and peaceful dialogue, by involving children, adolescents and their families through psychosocial and educational services. Such services will also be helpful in integrating refugee youth in their present context and in facilitating their possible return to the homeland.

(c) Establishing local advocacy and sensitization initiatives for the prevention of community-based violence and discrimination against vulnerable groups

Advocacy for the rights of communities and groups is a matter of first importance in the target areas for the prevention and mitigation of community-based violence. This subject comes to be very delicate and sensitive, especially due to the growing presence of refugees from Syria affecting everyday life of local communities, already partly neglected in their own fundamental rights. The approach proposed in this activity aims at widely shared recognition of problems, and at elaborating a likewise largely shared strategy, which will be formally accepted and applied by Steering Committees of local moral community leaders. The strategy shall entail both advocacy elements and sensitization for fundamental rights at grass-root level.

Within the regional advocacy strategy, an early alert system for rising community-based tension will be implemented with the participation of all Peace Centre staff, reaching out to local communities through sensitization at grass-root level. Whenever community-based tension and violence will arise in the target areas covered by one of the two main Peace Centres, following the rules and commitments stated in the common protocol, the relevant local Steering Committee members will visit the affected place in order to start, support or even enforce peaceful dialogue among the affected communities. Even in absence of open violence, one visit of each Steering Committee to places of local tensions or other community-related problems will be scheduled per year in any case, as a positive sign to address tensions and problems together.

The advocacy initiative shall hence rely on three components: 1) the elaboration of an advocacy strategy for each target region under the auspices of the two Steering Committees; the strategy will also be diffused to other organisations working in the target areas, serving as guidelines for advocacy needs and interventions for civil society organisations and public authorities; 2) the training of all Peace Centre staff (two main centres and five outreach centres) for rising awareness for the prevention of community-based violence and discrimination against vulnerable groups, for working on a sensitization of communities at grass-root level and for applying the early alert mechanism; 3) the implementation of the strategy following an early alert through public visits of the Steering Committee to places of community-based tension and violence and through public statements by the Steering Committee towards national authorities or media.

(d) Establishing interreligious dialogue and conflict transformation modules for beneficiaries and their families and communities

The Peace Centres will involve a large number of children and adolescents with a large set of psychosocial and educational activities, answering to the needs of those direct beneficiaries and establishing and consolidating a strong relationship between the Peace Centres, direct beneficiaries and their families. Based on the building and consolidation of this reciprocal trust, the Peace Centres will invite the families of their direct beneficiaries to know each other and to participate to common workshop sessions on interreligious dialogue and conflict transformation, thus responding to the general need of host and refugee population to diminish and manage sectarian tension and violence. Having their children already been working together and giving already a consolidated relationship with the staff of the centres, it will be easier to involve families of different communities to participate in informal and participative workshops on such issues.

This activity will be conducted in each of the seven Peace Centres established under this Programme Line (two main and five outreach centres). The activity will be split in several phases. First, all the local personnel working in the project will be trained on the subject by Lebanese and international consultants, particularly experienced on the subject and with solid theoretic background. In the second phase, selected local personnel (staff of the Peace Centres that will be primarily engaged in psychosocial and educational activities) will conduct workshop sessions on interreligious dialogue and conflict transformation, directed to the beneficiaries of the Peace Centres and involving their parents and possibly other multipliers. The workshop sessions will be offered for different age groups, also including young adults. The Steering Committees of both main Peace Centres will be actively involved into the design and the implementation of both phases.

Furthermore, activities carried out under complementary Programme Lines shall include these topics of interreligious dialogue and conflict transformation into their programming, for instance through common cultural activities (theatre, etc.), common sport activities (mixed teams, etc.) or awareness-raising in educational courses. The Field Manager shall make sure that regular meetings of all Peace Centre staff will address this question for planning purposes.

(e) Establishing Youth Committees in every Peace Centre elected by young beneficiaries

The Peace Centres shall not only be a place where children and adolescents receive assistance; it is also supposed to be a school of citizenship where the next generation is learning to take responsibility for their own development and for the future of their families, communities and nations. The youth shall be empowered to orient their freedom towards the common good.

For this purpose, the young beneficiaries of each Peace Centre are invited to participate in the governance of their Centre. After an initial period of six months, a plenary assembly open to all registered beneficiaries below the age of 25 years shall be organised where those present shall elect a Peace Centre Youth Committee of 15 representatives of all age groups and of different communities. The term of this Youth Committee shall be limited to one year. A plenary assembly shall be convoked at least annually or whenever the Field Manager sees a specific need. A preparatory workshop shall elaborate beforehand the Internal Rules of Procedure of this Youth Committee, specifying the exact modalities of its election and its work. These Internal Rules of Procedure shall entail a mechanism to ensure that all religious communities and all age groups (from 6 to 9, from 10 to 12, from 11 to 13, from 14 to 16, from 17 to 19 and those beyond) are represented. The final draft of the Internal Rules of Procedure shall be adopted by the aforementioned plenary assembly; it requires prior or posterior approval by the Field Manager and by the local Steering Committee. The Youth Committee shall be entitled to make suggestions to the Field Manager on the conduct of all activities within the Peace

Centre and its surroundings. A special budget might be allocated to the Youth Committee to conduct its own activities in accordance with the objectives of R&R Syria. The Field Manager in charge has the duty to supervise such activities; he/she has the duty and right to veto them if they are contrary to the objective and the spirit of R&R Syria or if they might harm its reputation or the activities related to the Peace Centre in any way.

The establishment of Youth Committees in every Peace Centre and their subsequent activities shall be related to the MoSAic project of the Italian cooperation that aims at establishing Municipal Youth Councils in different municipalities of Lebanon in the framework of The Child Friendly Cities programme, an action that translates the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. MoSAic staff shall be consulted, exploring the possibility to integrate the Youth Committee in a process leading to the establishment of Municipal Youth Councils.

VII. Staff Planning

The minimum requirement for carrying out the activities under this Programme Line is the full-time employment or engagement of one Country Director for Lebanon and of one Field Manager per Peace Centre. The former will be in charge as coordinator for the implementation of this Programme Line with regard to the regional Steering Committees. The latter will be in charge of the daily management of a Peace Centre and will supervise all local staff to be employed/engaged under this or complementary Programme Line(s); he/she will respond to the Country Director and possibly to an Implementation Officer who will assist the Country Director.

As from the opening of every Peace Centre, at least two technical assistants shall be employed/ engaged per Peace Centre, either part-time or full-time, for supporting the Field Manager in the maintenance of the facilities: one as concierge and one as bus driver. Further coordinators and operators shall be employed/ engaged under the provisions of the complementary Programme Lines. Besides the aforementioned Implementation Officer, the Country Director may be supported by one Communication Officer to be located at the central office in Beirut.

External consultants shall be engaged at different steps of the Programme Line, according to the specific needs of each activity. Especially Activities (b), (c) and (d) will require punctual external expertise, to be drawn from Lebanese or international consultants. Basic training of the Peace Centre staff under Activity (b) may preliminarily be provided by training modules offered free-of-charge by partner organisations in Lebanon.

VIII. Budget

This Programme Line is the overarching umbrella programme for all activities of R&R Syria in Lebanon. Hence, it covers also administrative and equipment costs for subordinated Programme Lines. Considering the fact that the exact amount of available funding is uncertain, the budget for this Programme Line is calculated on the basis of an annual estimation. Under the condition of available funding and the respect of its Internal Rules of Procedure, the staff of R&R Lebanon is authorised to engage the costs listed in the provisional annual budget below.

As defined earlier, the minimum operational costs for maintaining this Programme Line are the rental costs of at least one Peace Centre and the employment/engagement of one Country Director and at least one Field Manager. The minimum operational costs are hence €4,700/month. The Board of Directors of R&R Syria has to be consulted immediately if the Treasurer of R&R Syria states in his/her monthly report that no funding is available for covering these minimum operational costs for at least three subsequent months. In this case, the Board of Directors has to decide how to proceed. If no satisfying solution can be found, the Programme Line must be frozen and all pending contracts or financial obligations have to be dissolved.

AUTHORISED ANNUAL BUDGET

(a) Human Resources

Item	Description	Unit Cost	Total Cost
Country Director	1 Country Director, full-time, based in Beirut, including insurance and allowances	€1,500/mth	18,000
Programme Officers	1 Implementation and 1 Communication Officer, full-time, based in Beirut, including insurance and allowances	€1,400/mth	33,600
Field Managers	2 Field Managers, full-time, based in Peace Centres, including insurance and allowances	€1,200/mth	28,800
Technical Staff	4 technical assistants (one chauffeur and one concierge per Peace Centre), full-time	€500/mth	24,000
Subtotal			104,400

(b) Rent and Consumables

Item	Description	Unit Cost	Total Cost
Rent for Peace Centres	2 Peace Centres: rent and maintenance costs, including electricity, water and heating	€2,000/mth	48,000
Rent for Headquarters	1 office space in Beirut, including electricity, water and heating	€500/mth	6,000
Stationary	Stationary and daily office consumables for headquarters and 2 Peace Centres	€400/mth	4,800
Insurance	Insurance for 2 Peace Centres and for all vehicles (4 cars and 2 minibuses)	€300/mth	3,600
Maintenance	Maintenance costs for 2 Peace Centres and for all vehicles (4 cars and 2 minibuses)	€300/mth	3,600
Communication	Telephone/fax/internet for 2 Peace Centres and headquarters	€450/mth	5,400
Catering	Costs for hospitality and basic food and medical supply in 2 Peace Centres and headquarters	€450/mth	5,400
Fuel	Fuel for all vehicles (4 cars and 2 minibuses)	€450/mth	5,400
Subtotal			82,200

(c) Services

Item	Description	Unit Cost	Total Cost
Training	Training sessions for all staff members and selected beneficiaries in 2 Peace Centres	€6,000/year	6,000
Consultancy	Consultancy for the design of activities (b), (c) and (d) as specified above	€2,000/year	2,000
Evaluation	External evaluation of all Programme Lines in Lebanon	€2,000/year	2,000
Legal Charges	Annual lawyer fee and administrative charges imposed by Lebanese law	€2,000/year	2,000
Bank Charges	Transaction costs and other banking fees for all Programme Lines in Lebanon	€2,500/year	2,000
Travel Costs	4 round-trips per year between Beirut and the international headquarters in Brussels	€2,000/year	2,000
Visibility	Visibility actions (conferences, etc.) and publications for all Programme Lines in Lebanon	€1,500/year	2,000
Subtotal			18,000

(d) Investments (only 1st year)

Item	Description	Unit Cost	Total Cost
Furniture	Refurbishment works, furniture and IT equipment for 2 Peace Centres and headquarters	€4,500/centre	9,000
Cars	4 cars for 2 Peace Centres and headquarters	€4,000/car	16,000
Minibuses	2 minibuses for 2 Peace Centres	€6,000/bus	12,000
Subtotal			37,000

TOTAL AUTHORISED COSTS PER YEAR

EUR 241,600